| 作 者： |
吴淼 |
| 单 位： |
华中科技大学 |
| 文章类别： |
管理 |
| 关 键 词： |
农产品质量安全； 激励不相容； 政府策略性应对 |
| 中文摘要： |
由于激励不相容和激励不足，负责农产品质量安全管理的政府部门有足够的空间规避责任，竞相采取各种策略性行为应对措施，使农产品质量安全的公共治理陷入困境，出现“市场”和 “政府”的双重失灵。建构有效的农产品质量安全公共治理机制，必须以农产品质量安全的信誉品属性为基础，针对政府管理农产品质量安全监管工作的性质，在给予农产品质量安全监管充分保障的前提下，创新激励和约束机制，使认真履行职责成为管理部门的最优选择以实现激励相容。 |
| 英文摘要： |
Because of the incentive incompatibility and under excitation, the government departments in charge of agricultural products’ QS (quality safety) have enough excuses to shirk their duties and take some strategic behaviors, which lead the QS public governance in a dilemma. Both “market” and “government” appear malfunction. To construct an effective QS public governance mechanism, all work should be based on the agricultural products’ QS credence goods’ attribute. In allusion to the characters of government monitoring system and under the condition of the guaranteed monitoring system, the motivation mechanism innovation and the related institution restraint would make it the best choice for administrative department to fulfill their responsibility earnestly. In this way, incentive compatibility would be possible.
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| 作者简介： |
（1975-），男，湖北利川人，法学博士，华中科技大学公共管理学院副教授，研究方向为公共治理与公共政策、“三农”问题。 |
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